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Abstract
Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. This paper
discusses inferential robustness as a strategy for justifying evidence
claims in spite of this fallibility. I argue that robustness can be
understood as a means of establishing the partial security of evidence
claims. An evidence claim is secure relative to an epistemic situation if
it remains true in all scenarios that are epistemically possible relative to
that epistemic situation.1
1 Three strategies
Assessments of evidence depend on fallible assumptions of various kinds. Heinrich
Hertz mistakenly assumed that his cathode tubes were sufficiently evacuated to
display the deflection of cathode rays by an electric field, supposing the rays to be
electrically charged. Galileo incorrectly assumed that the combined orbital and
rotational motions of the earth would producing a sloshing of the oceans that
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would be observed as tidal phenomena, and concluded that tidal phenomena
constituted evidence for such terrestrial motion. In 1984, Carlo Rubbia of the UA1
Collaboration at CERN believed that, in data collected from high energy proton
collisions looking for a decay signature of the top quark, background processes had
been sufficiently accounted for to regard the remaining excess of events as evidence
of top quark production. A significant source of background had been overlooked,
however. There was no evidence for the top quark until ten years later.2
One strategy for coping with the fallibility of such evidence claims is to seek
further support for assumptions about which one is uncertain, and to use only
those assumptions whose support is thus strengthened. Call this the strengthening
strategy. Its strongest form would be to rely only on those assumptions for which
one has conclusive evidence. But the effectiveness of the conclusiveness standard is
in tension with its practical value. If we give “conclusive evidence” a sufficiently
strong reading to remove all possibilities of error in one’s background assumptions,
however remote or implausible, one will rarely if ever be in a position to make
interesting evidence claims.
A second strategy — call it weakening — is to alter one’s conclusion to a
claim logically weaker than the original, so that potentially false assumptions are
no longer needed. Instead of claiming that one has discovered evidence for, say, the
positron (in the sense of the anti-electron of current theory), one might claim only
evidence for a positively charged particle with mass on the order of that of the
negatively charged electron, as Carl Anderson did in his 1933 “discovery of the
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positron.” This strategy also has an extreme version, which is to forego any
ampliative inference whatever and conclude only what can be derived deductively
from the data in light of the assumptions of which one is already certain.
A third strategy (used possibly in conjunction with the other two) is to
appeal to robustness considerations (Campbell & Fiske 1959; Levins 1966; Staley
2004; Wimsatt 1981). In appealing to robustness, one bases one’s evidence claims
on the convergent outcomes of multiple tests drawing upon independent
assumptions. This broad characterization of robustness runs together inferential
strategies that can be distinguished both in terms of their function and their
rationale. The present discussion will focus on what Woodward calls “inferential
robustness,” which he characterizes as arising in situations where there is a single
body of data D, to be used to reach a conclusion S, where drawing such a
conclusion requires the use of some additional assumption drawn from a collection
of different competing possibilities Ai. If D supports S regardless of which of the
Ai is used, then we will say that the support D provides for S is inferentially robust
with respect to Ai (Woodward 2006, 219).
The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a dimension of epistemic
assessment that is appropriate for understanding these strategies, particularly
inferential robustness. (Henceforth, all references to robustness should be
understood in terms of inferential robustness.) Such an effort is needed because,
although we might assume that some kind of requirement of reliability, in a broadly
frequentist sense, of one’s inferential procedure is relevant, if not central, to the
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notion of empirical evidence, there are reasons to suspect that reliability
considerations are insufficient by themselves to explicate what is at stake in coping
with the fallibility of background assumptions, at least insofar as these are
addressed by inferential robustness. A somewhat different perspective can put the
strengthening, weakening, and robustness strategies into focus, so that it can be
seen clearly how all three strategies contribute in different ways to the same
epistemic goal, which I articulate in terms of security.
In what follows, I will illustrate robustness with a recent example from the
search for dark matter (section two). That example will also serve as the basis for
an argument to the effect that what is at issue in at least some uses of the
robustness strategy cannot be captured by appealing to reliability considerations
alone (section three). In section four, I introduce as a heuristic the notion of a
space of epistemic possibilities and define security. I use that definition to frame
general arguments for the epistemic relevance of security in section five, and I
conclude with a clarification of the robustness strategy and some comments on the
relationship between security and probability.
2 An Example: Evidence for Dark Matter?
Here I discuss a recent example of the inferential robustness strategy, used in the
assessment of evidence for weakly interacting massive particles (WIMP’s). The
evidence claim in question is that data revealing an annual modulation of the
detection rate in particle interactions with nuclei in scintillating sodium-iodide
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crystals is evidence that those crystals are immersed in a ‘WIMP wind’ due to
Earth’s movement through a WIMP halo that pervades the galaxy. That claim has
been put forth by the DAMA-NaI group, operating deep underground at the Gran
Sasso laboratory in Italy. DAMA’s claim has been contested by the negative results
of other groups using more conventional experimental methods (i.e., looking for
statistical excesses in the detection rate beyond expectations from background).
The dispute has been discussed in admirable detail by Robert Hudson (2007a,
2009).3 Here I take no stance regarding the dispute over DAMA’s results, but only
seek to understand the nature of one argument implicated in that dispute. Thus
the present paper will only sketch very roughly the broad outlines of DAMA’s
analysis and result.
As Hudson explains, the initial positive result from DAMA was presented
both in terms of an estimate of the WIMP mass (mW ) and interaction cross section
(ξσp), and in the form of a “contour” in the space of possible values of mW and
ξσp. DAMA’s search strategy is to examine the distribution of interaction events
with regard to energy, location within the detector, and time over a one-year data
collection period. This information is summarized in the number Nijk, where index
i indicates the i-th day, j indicates the j-th detector, and k indicates the k-th
energy interval or “bin”, each event being recorded as falling into a bin of width 1
keV, from 2-20 keV.
The analysis of this data assumes a theoretical model in which the earth
moves through a “halo” of WIMP dark matter with a variable velocity
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vr(t) = VSun + VEarthcosγcosω(t− t0) in the galactic frame, where VSun is the Sun’s
velocity with respect to the halo, VEarth is the Earth’s orbital velocity about the
sun, γ = 60◦ is the angle of inclination of Earth’s orbital plane with respect to the
galactic plane, ω = 2pi/T with T = 1 year, and t0 ' June 2nd. This model is used
to derive a first order Taylor approximation for the signal rate in the k-th energy
interval as Sk = S0,k + Sm,kcosω(t− t0). Consider this, with the parameters,
respectively, for the unmodulated and modulated terms, S0,k, Sm,k 6= 0 for at least
some k as the theoretical model for a WIMP annual modulation.
To make the connection between this theoretical model and the results
mentioned above, DAMA assumes a model of the data as being generated by a
Poisson process with mean value µijk = (bjk + S0,k + Sm,kcosω(ti− t0))Mj∆ti∆Ejk.
Here bjk represents a time independent background, Mj is the mass of the j-th
detector, ∆ti is the actual running time for the detector on the i-th day, ∆E = 1
keV represents the width of the energy intervals, and jk is the analysis cut
efficiency. A time correlation analysis is then employed that uses a maximum
likelihood method to produce an estimate of the WIMP mass and interaction cross
section. The likelihood function L can be written in terms of µijk and Nijk, and
the maximum likelihood can be determined by minimizing the function
y = −2ln(L )− const. Such an analysis, carried out on their first year of data,
yields the estimates MW = (59
+36
−19) GeV and ξσp = (1.0
+0.1
−0.4) 10
−5 pb. In addition,
using the ratio λ of likelihoods between the hypothesis H1 of annual modulation,
with specific values of mW and ξσp, and the hypothesis H0 of no annual
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modulation, they define -2lnλ as a χ2 statistic, and generate a plot of the region in
mW − ξσp space where H1 is favored over H0 at a 90% confidence level.
The 2002 paper by Belli et al. that features a robustness analysis advertises
itself as an extension of the “previous analyses” (those using the just described
methods of data analysis (Bernabei, Belli, Montecchia, et al. 1998, 1999; Bernabei,
Belli, Cerulli, et al. 2000)) “by discussing in detail the implications of the results of
the uncertainties on the dark matter galactic velocity distribution” (Belli, Cerulli,
Fornengo, & Scopel 2002). More specifically, those earlier analyses adopted the
“standard” isothermal sphere model of the WIMP galactic halo. Belli et al. note
that, in spite of its simplicity, a number of the assumptions of that model “are not
strongly constrained by astrophysical observations” (ibid., 2). Moreover, the
expected rate of WIMP interactions is determined in part by the distribution
function for WIMPs in their six-dimensional position-velocity phase space, a
function that in turn depends on the model of the galactic halo. That expected
rate has consequences for the likelihood functions on which the earlier analyses
depended. Thus, they seek to “study in a systematic way possible departures from
the isothermal sphere model . . . specifically . . . modifications arising from the
various matter density profiles, effects due to anisotropies of the velocity dispersion
tensor and rotation of the galactic halo” (ibid., 1). The paper proceeds to examine
four general classes of galactic halo models: spherically symmetric matter density
with isotropic velocity dispersion, spherically symmetric matter density with
nonisotropic velocity dispersion, axisymmetric models, and triaxial models.
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Contours are presented for representatives from each class of models. The details
need not further detain us. Noteworthy, however, is the conclusion drawn: “The
hypothesis of WIMP annual modulation, already favored in the previous studies by
using an isothermal sphere, is confirmed in all the investigated scenarios, and the
effects of the different halo models on the determination of the allowed maximum
likelihood region in the WIMP mass and WIMP-nucleon cross section have been
derived” (ibid., 16, emphasis added).
3 Reliability and Robustness
Here I argue that frequentist reliability considerations, narrowly construed, are
insufficient to account for the epistemic value of the robustness strategy as
employed in this case. The DAMA group offers their robustness analysis of their
evidence claim in order to explain “the implications on [their previous results] of
the uncertainties on the dark matter galactic velocity distribution” (ibid., 1). That
is, they had previously employed a model of the galactic dark matter halo that,
supposing there is such a halo, might not correctly describe it.
Might the correct way to understand their analysis be that they are
attempting to defend the reliability of their results, by employing a procedure that
restricts the probability of arriving at an erroneous result? For example, we might
view them as applying a severe-test requirement, in Mayo’s sense (Mayo 1996), to
their earlier evidence claim. That requirement can be framed as follows: Suppose
that hypothesis H is subjected to test procedure T , resulting in data x0; then H’s
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passing T with x0 constitutes the passing of a severe test (and hence evidence for
H) just in case x0 fit H, and the probability of H passing T with an outcome such
as x0 (i.e., one that fits H at least as well as x0 does), given that H is false, is very
low (ibid., esp. 178–87).
DAMA’s original evidence claim does indeed seem to rest on the satisfaction
of the severe test requirement. Their use of the confidence level construction
method makes this a natural construal, as the rationale for that method depends in
part on the long-run error characteristics ensured by the appropriate use of a test
statistic that follows a χ2 distribution. However, the robustness argument offered
by Belli et al. eludes such a characterization in terms of severity or even some more
general frequentist notion of reliability. The paper seeks to address an uncertainty
regarding an assumption about the galactic halo that is used in defending the
reliability of their original inference (from the annual modulation data to the
contour described above). However, the argument is obviously not meant to give
evidence that the original assumption regarding the galactic halo is true, since the
paper discusses other possible models and makes no effort to argue against them.
To put the point again in terms of severity, the robustness argument does not itself
apply the severe test requirement to any hypothesis, but rather seems directed at
possibilities of error that would undermine DAMA’s claim to have severely tested
(and passed) the hypothesis of WIMP annual modulation.
That suggests the possibility that DAMA is here attempting to give
second-order evidence (Staley 2004): they are giving evidence, based on the
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agreement between the contours generated by different galactic halo model
assumptions, that the annual modulation data really are evidence for the existence
of WIMP dark-matter. On the severe-testing account, this would require showing
that, assuming the annual modulation data is not evidence for a WIMP annual
modulation, there is a very low probability these different analyses would yield
contours that agree as well as these do. However, nowhere in the paper presenting
this analysis can such an argument be found. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such
an argument could be made within the domain of frequentist statistics. To do so
would require answering the difficult question: On what would the error rates of
such a test depend? More precisely, how would one model scenarios in which the
annual modulation data are not evidence for a WIMP annual modulation so as to
be able to estimate such error rates, even qualitatively?4
I propose that a more satisfactory understanding of Belli et al.’s reasoning
can be achieved if we attend more closely to the kind of problem that this kind of
robustness argument seeks to address and what is distinctive about its approach to
that kind of problem. Specifically, this type of robustness argument responds to
uncertainty regarding assumptions, and does so, not by removing that uncertainty
(as in the strengthening strategy), but by showing how evidence claims remain
valid in spite of that uncertainty. In the next section, I begin the articulation of a
framework for making sense of such a strategy.
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4 The space of epistemic possibilities and security
When an investigator puts forth an empirical evidence claim, she relies on a
number of other claims. Some of these are claims may be known, while others
might be relied upon without being known to be true.
The idea of a space of epistemic possibility gives us a way of picturing this
situation in terms of a space of scenarios that might for all we know be actual. In
his seminal formulation Hintikka (1962) takes expressions of the form “It is
possible, for all that S knows, that P” to have the same meaning as “It does not
follow from what S knows that not-P .” This account has been contested, however
(see, e.g., Kratzer 1977; DeRose 1991; Chalmers 2011), and attempts to provide
semantics for epistemic modals now focus more broadly on the conditions under
which one may correctly assert “It might be that P” and related statements. As far
as I can tell, nothing in the discussion that follows turns on just which analysis we
use. It should, however, be emphasized that on no account of epistemic modals is it
the case that merely believing that P is false makes it false the P might be true.
For purposes of the present discussion, what is crucial about the space of
epistemically possible scenarios is that as knowledge is gained, more scenarios are
ruled out, and the space of what is epistemically possible shrinks (Chalmers 2011).
To state it with a little more precision, though still informally: If (i) Ω is the space
of epistemically possible scenarios relative to a body of knowledge K, (ii) Ω′ is the
space of epistemically possible scenarios relative to K ′, and (iii) K ⊂ K ′, then
11
Ω′ ⊂ Ω.
With this heuristic picture in mind, the investigator who seeks to make an
evidence claim can be thought of as not knowing ‘where she is’ in the space of
epistemic possibilities relative to her knowledge. Of course, the assumptions she
uses in advancing her evidence claim that she knows to be true, will be true
throughout that space, but other claims that she uses may be true in some regions
and false in others. What is more, the evidence claim itself may or may not be true
throughout the entire range of epistemic possibilities.
In practice, this problem is addressed by investigators as they try to
anticipate objections that they might encounter in the presentation of conclusions
from experimental data. Many such potential challenges can be thought of as
presenting possible scenarios in which the experimenters have gone wrong in
drawing the conclusions that they do (what we might call error scenarios). Such
challenges are not posed arbitrarily or simply on the grounds that they are logically
possible. Rather, both experimenters in anticipating challenges and their audience
in posing them draw upon a body of knowledge in determining the kinds of
challenges that are significant (Staley 2008).
Security is here proposed as a heuristic that might help systematize the
strategies that experimenters use in responding to a generic problem: the
investigator has good reason to consider whether it is possible that her evidence
claim is false. If it is possible, what is the range of possible scenarios in which it is
false, and can steps be taken to eliminate some of those possibilities? I propose
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that the following working definition reflects certain key elements of the problem
that faces investigators justifying evidence claims based on fallible assumptions,
such that it may prove a useful starting point for more systematic work to come.
JE (Security). Suppose that Ω0 is the set of all epistemically possible scenarios
relative to epistemic situation K, and Ω1 ⊆ Ω0. A proposition P is secure
throughout Ω1 relative to K iff for any scenario ω ∈ Ω1, P is true. If P is secure
throughout Ω0 then it is fully secure.
The notion of an epistemic situation is borrowed from Achinstein (2001), who
describes an epistemic situation as a situation in which “among other things, one
knows or believes that certain propositions are true, one is not in a position to
know or believe that others are, and one knows (or does not know) how to reason
from the former to the hypothesis” (ibid., 20).
Here I wish to focus on applying the concept of security to claims about
evidence – i.e., claims taking the form ‘Data x0 are evidence for the hypothesis that
H.’ An evidence claim is secure for an agent to the extent that it holds true across
a range of scenarios that are epistemically possible for that agent. Exactly which
scenarios are epistemically possible for a given agent is opaque, and not all
epistemically possible scenarios are equally relevant, so the methodologically
significant questions turns out to be centered on relative security : how do
investigators make their evidential inferences more secure? And which scenarios are
the ones against which they ought to secure such inferences? (Consequently, there
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is no need to settle on any particular analysis of knowledge, since neither the
enhancement of relative security nor the establishment of security across a range of
possibilities specified as relevant requires one at any point to identify exactly what
it is that a person knows.)
5 A general argument for security
Before showing how security helps us to understand the robustness strategy, I wish
to give a general defense of the epistemic relevance of security by showing that, all
else being equal, an investigator should prefer, on error-avoidance grounds, making
an evidence claim that is more secure to making a claim that is less secure.
Suppose that S is a person engaged in empirical inquiry with regard to some
question Q, to which H is a hypothetical answer. Suppose that x0 represents a
possible body of data relevant to H. C is the claim “x0 is evidence for H.” K
represents S’s epistemic situation at a particular time, Ω0 is the set of all scenarios
epistemically possible relative to K, and C is secure across Ω1 ⊂ Ω0. Suppose
further that S is error-averse in the sense that she seeks to make evidence claims
that will not be refuted by subsequent inquiry.
Now suppose that there is a strategy available to S that results in S being
able to make an evidence claim C ′ that is secure across Ω2, where Ω1 ⊂ Ω2. This
might be accomplished by replacing H with a logically weaker H ′ (weakening
strategy) or by gathering additional information that supports auxiliary
assumptions (strengthening). Either way, there is an asymmetry between the
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potential failures of the two claims C and C ′. For any epistemically possible
scenario in which C ′ fails, C also fails. But there are some epistemically-possible
scenarios in which C fails, but C ′ does not. Thus the scenarios in which C ′
continues to be upheld as true include all those in which C continues to be upheld
as true, as well as some of those in which C is discovered to be false. Since S aims
to avoid making evidence claims that are discovered to be false, she should prefer,
all else being equal, to make claim C ′ rather than C. I hasten to note, however,
that the very fact that a strategy is required to make the claim C ′ rather than C
ensures that not all will be equal. Pursuit of either weakening or strengthening
strategies will involve some cost, which is relevant to the choice of epistemic
strategy. The point of this argument is not to show that one should always pursue
a security-enhancing strategy, but only to point out the epistemic relevance of
security considerations to decisions about the handling of evidence.
It will be noted that, as described, the secure regions for claims C and C ′
were nested, and one might wonder what might be said about cases in which this is
not so. For example Ω1 and Ω2 might overlap without either being contained in the
other, or they might be entirely disjoint. It would be tempting here to say that one
should then consider the size of the secure regions of the two claims in deciding
what claim would be preferable. Indeed, this seems to be the right answer,
provided that the crucial condition “all else being equal” were understood in the
sense of “there is no more reason to think that one is in one region of the space of
epistemic possibility than in any other.” However, this latter condition is rarely,
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perhaps never, satisfied. Although one is aware in an evidential inference that there
is a range of possibilities of error, some of these possibilities will be more worrisome
than others. Clearly, some means of weighing the relevance of scenarios is needed.
Although I attempt no solution to this problem in the present paper, I will
comment on it in the conclusion.
6 Conclusion: Robustness, dark matter, and probability
We can now revisit the robustness strategy and see more clearly how it works to
establish security of evidence. First, note that robustness is distinct from
weakening and strengthening strategies that increase the security of an evidence
claim. An appeal to robustness serves to show that the claim C is secure across a
range of possible scenarios ΩR (represented by the different possible auxiliary
assumptions), where in the absence of the appeal to robustness one might know
only that C is secure across some smaller range of scenarios Ω ⊂ ΩR, or be quite
uncertain about the possible conditions under which C might fail to hold true.
Although the possibility for error, objectively speaking, is unchanged, the
investigator making claim C on the basis of a robustness analysis is in a better
position to argue that C is not in error.
Consider how this applies to the dark matter case. The problem confronted
by the argument given by Belli et al. is that, for all they know, the theoretical
model of the WIMP galactic halo used by DAMA in their original analysis might
be false. So what happens if some other model is the correct one? Belli et
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al. examine four classes of models, any of which might, for all they know, include
the correct one, and they find that the WIMP annual modulation hypothesis is
“confirmed in all the investigated scenarios” (Belli et al. 2002, 16). In other words,
even if the isothermal sphere model is false, so long one of the investigated classes
includes a model that is adequate for the purpose of estimating the annual
modulation (Parker 2012), DAMA’s data are still evidence for WIMPs. The effect
of this argument, then, is to show, in a way that DAMA’s original analysis did not,
the extent to which the evidence for WIMP annual modulation is secure.
As noted above, not all possible scenarios are equally important in
considering threats to the truth of a given evidence claim. Some possibilities (such
as cosmic conspiracies) will be too implausible to bother with. One might object
that the approach here discussed fails to deploy an obvious resource for dealing
with this issue, which would be some kind of epistemic probability such as that
deployed by Bayesians.
Although a full treatment of this issue goes beyond the scope of a brief essay, I
will make two brief comments to justify my pursuit of a non-probabilistic approach.
First, I have sought to develop an account that is compatible with theories of
evidence that treat probability in frequentist terms, such as Mayo’s error-statistical
approach (Mayo 1996; Mayo & Spanos 2009). An important motivation for
advocates of error-statistical approaches is to avoid assigning probabilities to
anything that resists being modeled as the outcome of a stochastic process of some
sort. Introducing a probability measure over scenarios, which cannot be thus
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modeled (worlds not being “as plentiful as blackberries,” to use Peirce’s memorable
phrase) would be conceptually at odds with the approach to evidence that is here
assumed as a starting point.5 If the measure were not a probability, it would need
to be provided with some other interpretation to be meaningful. Having no
defensible interpretation at hand, I deem it advisable for now to eschew such a
measure entirely..
Unlike the first point, the second point does not require that we assume an
error-statistical viewpoint. Regardless of one’s preferred approach to statistical
inference, in practice one must make assumptions. These may be regarded either as
background assumptions serving to underwrite an ampliative inference (like the
role of model assumptions in the inference from data to conclusion in
error-statistics) or as part of the premises (as in Howson and Urbach’s treatment of
Bayesianism as a deductive logic of probabilities (Howson & Urbach 2006)). As
part of the justification of an inference, one must defend the appropriateness of
these assumptions (so that they are not mere, i.e. unfounded, assumptions), and a
thorough justification requires consideration of the various ways, given what one
knows, that those assumptions might fail to be appropriate. The notion of
‘appropriateness’ here will depend on the framework and perhaps even the nature
of the particular inference. For the purposes of securing evidence, the concern is
with those flaws in assumptions which would result in the presumptive evidence for
the conclusion turning out not to be evidence for the conclusion, or evidence of a
weaker sort than was thought.
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For “objective” or “reference” Bayesians, for example, the choice of a prior
probability distribution is a matter of finding a distribution that is noninformative
in some sense. Although this sounds like a simple criterion, it is in practice not at
all simple to execute, and even specifying the appropriate sense in which a
distribution should be noninformative is a matter of debate (see, e.g., Berger &
Bernardo 1992). Clearly, there are ways in which one might go wrong in
attempting to specify a noninformative prior, and the justification of an inference
based on such a prior will need to attend to these.
It might be thought that this kind of problem is avoided by subjective
Bayesians, for whom an “anything goes” approach to priors is allowed. Here, too,
things are not quite as simple as they might seem. Even subjective Bayesian priors
are constrained to satisfy coherence, making the possible failure of a specified prior
to meet this standard a matter of consideration. This is not trivial, even in
apparently simple cases. Consider David Lindley’s (1993) variant of Fisher’s
famous “lady tasting tea” example.6 In it, a lady who is presented as a wine-tasting
authority is given pairs of glasses of wine and is asked to determine by taste alone
which glass holds a Californian wine and which contains a French wine. The
inference concerns the probability pi that she will identify them correctly. Lindley
gives for his prior distribution regarding the value of pi a beta distribution on the
interval 0.5 < pi < 1. The density function for this distribution resembles the St.
Louis arch and has a peak at pi = 0.75. As noted by Stephen Senn, however, this
distribution is an odd choice in light of the following considerations (Senn 2001):
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Either the lady’s belief in her abilities is justified or it is not. If it is justified, then
she will be able to make the requested identifications with probability nearly equal
to one. If she is not justified, then she is just guessing and the probability of success
is near one-half. Senn suggests that because she just might have “a fine palate but
a poor knowledge” a small probability should be reseved for pi being nearly zero
(she can tell the two wines apart but consistently misidentifies their provenance).7
The problem here is not that Lindley’s prior is wrong, but that if Lindley’s
background knowledge includes the substantive knowledge about expertise and the
distinction between palate and knowledge that informs the above criticism, the
prior distribution that he himself claims to represent his probability assignments to
the relevant hypotheses is not coherent with his background knowledge. So prior
probabilities cannot simply be written down willy-nilly. Rather, the subjective
Bayesian also needs to consider the ways in which, given what she knows, her
assignment of a prior might fail to be appropriate.
Another kind of security problem that affects Bayesians arises in cases where
the space of possibilities across which a prior distribution is specified suddenly
expands because new possibilities are thought of. Posterior probabilities that were
arrived at from the earlier prior become senseless. One has to “cross these out”
and start over with a new prior distribution. This kind of problem is well-known in
discussions of Bayesian philosophy of science (Earman 1992, ch. 8). In situations,
therefore, in which the prospects are strong for previously unconceived possibilities
emerging, all Bayesian inferences must be considered as vulnerable to such
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non-Bayesian corrections.
The upshot of these considerations is that, without contesting that the
assignment of a measure across a range of scenarios might be a suitable Bayesian
technique, it is a technique that presupposes the kind of consideration of the range
of possible scenarios that a security perspective demands. Furthermore insofar as
the distribution itself constitutes an additional assumption, one can apply the
security framework also to that assignment, asking for the possible ways in which it
might fail to cohere with one’s background beliefs or knowledge. To put the point
in terms of a slogan: “possibility comes before probability.”
More specifically, possibilities of error in judgments about evidence demand
attention before judgments about probability can be taken seriously. Here I have
attempted to clarify the role of inferential robustness considerations in attending to
such possibilties.
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Notes
1I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Jan
Sprenger, Joe Salerno, and audiences at Eastern Tennessee State Univer-
sity, University of Frankfurt and University of Wuppertal. Conversations
with Aaron Cobb were especially helpful in developing the ideas here pre-
sented.
2In describing these examples in this way, I am using a concept of evidence
that is objective in the sense that whether such evidence obtains is a
matter that is independent of what anyone believes about the data, the
hypothesis in question, or the relations between them (see Achinstein
2001).
3Hudson (2007b) employs the debate over DAMA’s results to argue against
the methodological value of robustness. I do not propose here to dispute
the arguments of that paper, but only note that under Hudson’s interpre-
tation of the term, the argument here considered does not exemplify an
appeal to robustness. Following Woodward (2006), I use the term more
broadly than Hudson.
4I am not claiming that the convergence of results from independent tests
never constitutes a severe test of any hypothesis, but only that some uses
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of such convergence cannot be thus interpreted.
5This point applies even if, as in the case of Lewis, one takes a realist
attitude toward possible worlds. Even if possible worlds are in fact as
plentiful as blackberries (in some sense), there is no plausible sense in
which the fact that we find ourselves in one particular actual world out of
all the epistemically possible worlds can be regarded as the outcome of a
stochastic process.
6I would like to thank Stephen Senn for making me aware of this example,
and the critique of Lindley’s prior that follows.
7In a separate, more detailed discussion, Lindley notes that it would be
realistic to assign a small probability to this last possibility, but keeps the
peak at pi = 0.75 (Lindley 1984).
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